[ Pobierz całość w formacie PDF ]
forge such an alliance. Nyerere,—sym-
ruling military junta were many who
grams of military support for their
pathetic to the MPLA’s political aims,—
sympathized with the Chinese—and it
Angolan allies.25
was exasperated by Neto’s unbending
had for some time sponsored both
The Soviets were prodded in their
demands in the negotiations. The
Neto’s MPLA rivals and a Cabinda
widening commitment to the MPLA by
Angolan leader was “a good poet and
separatist group. The latter issue was
the Cuban leaders. Cuba had supplied
doctor,” Nyerere told the East German
particularly problematic, and Agostinho
the MPLA with some material support
ambassador, but “a bad politician.”
Neto had on several occasions criticized
since the mid-1960s, and Havana had
Nyerere also warned the Soviets against
the Congolese leader Colonel Marien
increasingly come to regard Agostinho
direct involvement in the Angolan con-
Nguabi for his support of Cabindan in-
Neto as its favorite African liberation
flict. African countries would react
dependence. Still, on December 4
leader. The Cubans told Moscow that
sharply against any form of foreign in-
Nguabi gave his go-ahead for the So-
Neto would not, and should not, accept
tervention, Nyerere said.28
viet operation.23
sharing power with the other move-
By early summer, 1975, the FNLA
Though noting the flexibility of the
ments. Cuba would itself concentrate
troops had mounted limited offensives
Congolese government, Afanasenko
more on Africa (i.e., Angola) in its for-
against the MPLA both along the coast
knew that the job of reinforcing the
eign policy, and expected the Soviets
and in the northern part of Angola.
MPLA would not be easy. In a report
to upgrade their support for the MPLA.
Then, in July, as another African-
to Moscow he underlined the problems
Moscow would not be bettered by Ha-
brokered attempt at negotiations broke
the MPLA faced on the military side.
vana. Afanasenko told the Cuban am-
down, the MPLA counterattacked. By
Both the FNLA, now joined by Daniel
bassador to Brazzaville that “the Cen-
the middle of the month, local FAPLA
Chipenda’s MPLA rebels, and UNITA
tral Committee of the CPSU is atten-
forces were in control of Luanda, and
held strong positions and would be
tively watching the development of
MPLA troops began attacking the
equipped further by the Americans and
events in Angola and reiterates [its]
FNLA strongholds in the north. The
the Chinese. In the civil war which the
unity with the progressive forces, in
Soviets had not foreseen the MPLA
ambassador predicted, the “reactionar-
order to smash the cherished adventures
military success, although the
ies” would initially have the initiative,
of foreign and domestic reaction.”26
Brazzaville embassy already in April
and the MPLA would depend on “ma-
The Soviet Union was also aware
foresaw an improvement of FAPLA
terial assistance from progressive coun-
of the increase in the U.S. Central In-
fighting capabilities because of the So-
tries all over the world” just to survive.
telligence Agency’s covert support for
viet aid. However, it did not expect a
Politically, however, Neto’s group, as
the FNLA starting in late January 1975.
full scale civil war to break out before
the “most progressive national-libera-
The Soviet embassy in Brazzaville con-
Angola achieved its independence in
tion organization of Angola,” would
cluded that the American assistance
November.29
enjoy considerable support. On the or-
would lead Holden Roberto to make an
Moscow now seemed to have the
ganizational side, one should not think
all-out bid for power very soon. The
recipe for success in Angola. By a lim-
of the MPLA as a vanguard party, or
embassy experts realized that there was
ited supply of military equipment, it had
even as a party at all, but rather as a
little the Soviet Union could do to as-
secured the MPLA the upper hand in
loose coalition of trade unionists, pro-
sist the MPLA resist the initial attacks
the fighting. As the date for indepen-
gressive intellectuals, Christian groups,
by Roberto’s forces. Their hope was
dence approached, Moscow expected
COLD WAR INTERNATIONAL HISTORY PROJECT BULLETIN 25
that the rival movements, or at least
Castro—who had close connections
plan for a direct military intervention.
UNITA, would return to the negotiat-
with the Congolese leaders—to act as a
Lucio Lara, the senior MPLA under-
ing table and become part of an MPLA-
facilitator for assistance to the MPLA.
ground leader in Luanda, on August 17
led coalition government. The Soviet
The Soviet leaders got more than they
appealed to Ambassador Afanasenko
experts did not believe that the United
bargained for. The Cubans had since
for the dispatch of Soviet staff officers
States would stage a massive interven-
early spring tried to get Moscow to sup-
to the MPLA General Command, which
tion, nor did they give much credence
port an armed strategy on behalf of the
had just moved from Brazzaville to
to MPLA reports of direct South Afri-
MPLA. Already in February, the Cu-
Luanda. “The MPLA Command needs
can or Zairean involvement. Their main
ban ambassador to Dar-es-Salaam had
qualified advice on military questions
worry was the Chinese, who had
told his Soviet colleague that “The
at the strategic level,” Lara said.
stepped up their FNLA assistance pro-
choice of the socialist road in Angola
Afanasenko, however, could only
gram from bases in Zaire. Moscow
must be made now. . . . In October it
promise technical experts, but agreed
found particularly disturbing the fact
will be too late.” In late summer, Castro
to invite MPLA’s defense minister des-
that the Chinese were joined as instruc-
used the new Soviet request as a stimu-
ignate, Iko Carreira, to Moscow in late
tors in these camps by military person-
lus for launching his own plan for the
August for talks with the CPSU CC In-
nel from Romania and North Korea.30
intervention of Cuban forces in
ternational Department, the Defense
The Ford Administration was,
Angola.33
Ministry, and the Armed Forces Gen-
however, not willing to let Neto’s
Cuba had sent military instructors
eral Staff.36
MPLA force a solution to the nascent
to work with the MPLA in its camps in
In spite of their policy to support
civil war in Angola. In mid-July 1975,
Congo for several years before the col-
Neto’s MPLA, the Soviet leaders were
the U.S. president authorized a large-
lapse of the Portuguese colonial empire.
not pleased with the content of the Cu-
scale covert operation in support of the
By early summer 1975 these advisers
ban plan. First of all, they objected to
FNLA and the UNITA. Over three
numbered about 250, and—in spite of
the use of Soviet officers and even So- [ Pobierz całość w formacie PDF ]
zanotowane.pl doc.pisz.pl pdf.pisz.pl rafalstec.xlx.pl
forge such an alliance. Nyerere,—sym-
ruling military junta were many who
grams of military support for their
pathetic to the MPLA’s political aims,—
sympathized with the Chinese—and it
Angolan allies.25
was exasperated by Neto’s unbending
had for some time sponsored both
The Soviets were prodded in their
demands in the negotiations. The
Neto’s MPLA rivals and a Cabinda
widening commitment to the MPLA by
Angolan leader was “a good poet and
separatist group. The latter issue was
the Cuban leaders. Cuba had supplied
doctor,” Nyerere told the East German
particularly problematic, and Agostinho
the MPLA with some material support
ambassador, but “a bad politician.”
Neto had on several occasions criticized
since the mid-1960s, and Havana had
Nyerere also warned the Soviets against
the Congolese leader Colonel Marien
increasingly come to regard Agostinho
direct involvement in the Angolan con-
Nguabi for his support of Cabindan in-
Neto as its favorite African liberation
flict. African countries would react
dependence. Still, on December 4
leader. The Cubans told Moscow that
sharply against any form of foreign in-
Nguabi gave his go-ahead for the So-
Neto would not, and should not, accept
tervention, Nyerere said.28
viet operation.23
sharing power with the other move-
By early summer, 1975, the FNLA
Though noting the flexibility of the
ments. Cuba would itself concentrate
troops had mounted limited offensives
Congolese government, Afanasenko
more on Africa (i.e., Angola) in its for-
against the MPLA both along the coast
knew that the job of reinforcing the
eign policy, and expected the Soviets
and in the northern part of Angola.
MPLA would not be easy. In a report
to upgrade their support for the MPLA.
Then, in July, as another African-
to Moscow he underlined the problems
Moscow would not be bettered by Ha-
brokered attempt at negotiations broke
the MPLA faced on the military side.
vana. Afanasenko told the Cuban am-
down, the MPLA counterattacked. By
Both the FNLA, now joined by Daniel
bassador to Brazzaville that “the Cen-
the middle of the month, local FAPLA
Chipenda’s MPLA rebels, and UNITA
tral Committee of the CPSU is atten-
forces were in control of Luanda, and
held strong positions and would be
tively watching the development of
MPLA troops began attacking the
equipped further by the Americans and
events in Angola and reiterates [its]
FNLA strongholds in the north. The
the Chinese. In the civil war which the
unity with the progressive forces, in
Soviets had not foreseen the MPLA
ambassador predicted, the “reactionar-
order to smash the cherished adventures
military success, although the
ies” would initially have the initiative,
of foreign and domestic reaction.”26
Brazzaville embassy already in April
and the MPLA would depend on “ma-
The Soviet Union was also aware
foresaw an improvement of FAPLA
terial assistance from progressive coun-
of the increase in the U.S. Central In-
fighting capabilities because of the So-
tries all over the world” just to survive.
telligence Agency’s covert support for
viet aid. However, it did not expect a
Politically, however, Neto’s group, as
the FNLA starting in late January 1975.
full scale civil war to break out before
the “most progressive national-libera-
The Soviet embassy in Brazzaville con-
Angola achieved its independence in
tion organization of Angola,” would
cluded that the American assistance
November.29
enjoy considerable support. On the or-
would lead Holden Roberto to make an
Moscow now seemed to have the
ganizational side, one should not think
all-out bid for power very soon. The
recipe for success in Angola. By a lim-
of the MPLA as a vanguard party, or
embassy experts realized that there was
ited supply of military equipment, it had
even as a party at all, but rather as a
little the Soviet Union could do to as-
secured the MPLA the upper hand in
loose coalition of trade unionists, pro-
sist the MPLA resist the initial attacks
the fighting. As the date for indepen-
gressive intellectuals, Christian groups,
by Roberto’s forces. Their hope was
dence approached, Moscow expected
COLD WAR INTERNATIONAL HISTORY PROJECT BULLETIN 25
that the rival movements, or at least
Castro—who had close connections
plan for a direct military intervention.
UNITA, would return to the negotiat-
with the Congolese leaders—to act as a
Lucio Lara, the senior MPLA under-
ing table and become part of an MPLA-
facilitator for assistance to the MPLA.
ground leader in Luanda, on August 17
led coalition government. The Soviet
The Soviet leaders got more than they
appealed to Ambassador Afanasenko
experts did not believe that the United
bargained for. The Cubans had since
for the dispatch of Soviet staff officers
States would stage a massive interven-
early spring tried to get Moscow to sup-
to the MPLA General Command, which
tion, nor did they give much credence
port an armed strategy on behalf of the
had just moved from Brazzaville to
to MPLA reports of direct South Afri-
MPLA. Already in February, the Cu-
Luanda. “The MPLA Command needs
can or Zairean involvement. Their main
ban ambassador to Dar-es-Salaam had
qualified advice on military questions
worry was the Chinese, who had
told his Soviet colleague that “The
at the strategic level,” Lara said.
stepped up their FNLA assistance pro-
choice of the socialist road in Angola
Afanasenko, however, could only
gram from bases in Zaire. Moscow
must be made now. . . . In October it
promise technical experts, but agreed
found particularly disturbing the fact
will be too late.” In late summer, Castro
to invite MPLA’s defense minister des-
that the Chinese were joined as instruc-
used the new Soviet request as a stimu-
ignate, Iko Carreira, to Moscow in late
tors in these camps by military person-
lus for launching his own plan for the
August for talks with the CPSU CC In-
nel from Romania and North Korea.30
intervention of Cuban forces in
ternational Department, the Defense
The Ford Administration was,
Angola.33
Ministry, and the Armed Forces Gen-
however, not willing to let Neto’s
Cuba had sent military instructors
eral Staff.36
MPLA force a solution to the nascent
to work with the MPLA in its camps in
In spite of their policy to support
civil war in Angola. In mid-July 1975,
Congo for several years before the col-
Neto’s MPLA, the Soviet leaders were
the U.S. president authorized a large-
lapse of the Portuguese colonial empire.
not pleased with the content of the Cu-
scale covert operation in support of the
By early summer 1975 these advisers
ban plan. First of all, they objected to
FNLA and the UNITA. Over three
numbered about 250, and—in spite of
the use of Soviet officers and even So- [ Pobierz całość w formacie PDF ]