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person would never be in. She does not explain moral requirement in
terms of what an ideally virtuous person would do in a given situa-
tion. In such a situation, an agent might still be able to avoid acting
cruelly, or unjustly.22
124 Gilbert Harman
Furthermore, Thomson s version is not committed to supposing that
moral education consists in character development.
Thomson s Virtue Ethics versus Ross s Theory of prima facie Duties?
What distinguishes Thomson s theory from a deontological theory like
Ross s that sees two families of prima facie duties, duties of justice and
duties of benevolence? There seems to be a strong parallel between
the two views. Wherever Thomson sees a virtue in one or another pos-
sible action, Ross sees a prima facie duty, and wherever Ross sees a
prima facie duty, Thomson sees a virtue in one or another possible
action.
Perhaps there is a disagreement about the order of explanation.
Maybe Thomson thinks we have a better grip on what it is for someone
to act unjustly or to be inconsiderate on a particular occasion, and Ross
thinks we have a better grip on what is involved in the prima facie duty
to be honest or benevolent.
One difference is that Ross s duties are prima facie, whereas
Thomson s virtues and vices are all or nothing. In Ross s view there
may be a conflict in prima facie duties. In Thomson s view there cannot
be an analogous conflict. So, for example, Thomson takes it to be impos-
sible to be in a situation in which, if one does A, one will be unjust, and
if one does not do A, one will be cruel.23
There certainly are cases in which there appears to be a conflict
between justice and kindness. A student has written a worthless paper.
If the teacher gives the student the failing grade that the paper
deserves, the student will not graduate, which will be a hardship both
to the student and to the student s family. It would seem not to be fair
to the other students that they are held to a higher standard than this
student. It might seem to be unjust to give the student a passing grade
yet cruel to give the student a failing grade.
How to resolve this apparent conflict? Thomson holds that both these
things cannot be true. It cannot be both unjust to give the student a
passing grade and also cruel not to do so. It cannot be unjust to do
something that it would be cruel not to do and it cannot be cruel to do
something that it would be unjust not to do. So, we have to choose
between these two possibilities. Which is it? Cruel to fail the student
or unjust not to?
Ross would say that we must decide between two prima facie duties,
the duty not to be unfair to the other students and the duty not to harm
the poorer student. If the duty not to be unfair wins out, then we are
not really violating a duty not to harm the student if we fail him. If the
duty not to harm the student takes precedence, then that really is our
Virtue Ethics without Character Traits 125
duty and we do not in this case have a duty of fairness to fail the
student.
For myself, I find it hard to say whether either of these ways of
looking at the issue makes more sense than the other does.
Objectivism
Thomson is an objectivist about the requirements of morality. She says,
a person s having done what morality requires him to do turns on
success rather than on intentions just as, for my own part, I believe
we should accept an objectivist view of the virtue properties (and their
contraries), that is, a view according to which an act s possessing a
virtue property (or its contrary) turns on success rather than on inten-
tions. 24 Does this mean that intentions are irrelevant or just not
enough?
Suppose Joan is morally required to return a book to Max. Uncon-
cerned with this requirement, she leaves the book on a bench in the
park. It happens that Max is the next along. He finds the book and
assumes it has been left there on purpose for him. Has Joan satisfied
the moral requirement to return the book? Has she acted justly? Wasn t
she careless to leave the book on the bench and isn t carelessness a vice?
Perhaps the answer is that carelessness is not a moral vice. Carefulness
is an all-purpose virtue, not a moral virtue. And, perhaps, it was not
unjust of her to leave the book on the bench, given how things worked
out!
But can t someone do the wrong thing through a failure of one of the
all-purpose virtues? Must this always involve a failure in one of the
moral virtues also? To be sure, if Ophelia fails to return the book she
owes to Max through imprudence, maybe then she has acted unjustly
to Max because of her imprudence. But if she wrongly allows Max to
be harmed because of her lack of courage, has she acted unkindly?
Here I am neither sure what the best view is nor sure what
Thomson s view is.
Conclusion
Philosophers attracted to virtue ethics should consider the account of
ethics that Thomson has been developing. Thomson s account focuses
on properties of particular actions and so avoids what seem to be
serious problems with versions of virtue ethics that focus on robust
character traits.25
126 Gilbert Harman
Notes
1. Utilitarianism and the Virtues.
2. The Right and the Good ; Evaluatives and Directives ; and Goodness and
Moral Requirement, from her 1999 Tanner Lectures.
3. Ross and Nisbett, The Person and the Situation; Railton, Made in the Shade: Moral
Compatibilism and the Aims of Moral Theory ; Doris, Persons, Situations, and
Virtue Ethics ; Harman, Moral Philosophy Meets Social Psychology: Virtue Ethics
and the Fundamental Attribution Error.
4. Thomson, The Right and the Good ; Ross, The Right and the Good.
5. Rawls, A Theory of Justice.
6. E.g., Hursthouse, Virtue Theory and Abortion, p. 225. However, Hursthouse imme-
diately goes on to modify her initial account of what someone ought to do.
7. See note 2.
8. For further elaboration see Harman, Human Flourishing, Ethics, and Liberty, pp.
307 322, and references included there.
9. Bennett, The Book of Virtues.
10. Hursthouse, Virtue Theory, p. 227, fn. 2.
11. Harman, Human Flourishing, p. 315. Hursthouse, Virtue Theory, p. 227, notes a
related point: as if the raped fifteen-year-old girl might be supposed to say to herself,
Now would Socrates have an abortion if he were in my circumstances?
12. We might suppose that being a good moral adviser is one of the virtues that an ideally
virtuous person must possess. But then the account would seem to become circular
and trivial. One ought morally to do what one would be advised to do by someone
who advises one to do something if and only if one ought morally to do it.
13. See note 3.
14. Harman, Moral Philosophy Meets Social Psychology.
15. Harman, Moral Philosophy and Linguistics.
16. The Right and the Good, p. 283.
17. Wallace, Virtues and Vices, similarly distinguishes three classes of character traits: (1) [ Pobierz całość w formacie PDF ]
zanotowane.pl doc.pisz.pl pdf.pisz.pl rafalstec.xlx.pl
person would never be in. She does not explain moral requirement in
terms of what an ideally virtuous person would do in a given situa-
tion. In such a situation, an agent might still be able to avoid acting
cruelly, or unjustly.22
124 Gilbert Harman
Furthermore, Thomson s version is not committed to supposing that
moral education consists in character development.
Thomson s Virtue Ethics versus Ross s Theory of prima facie Duties?
What distinguishes Thomson s theory from a deontological theory like
Ross s that sees two families of prima facie duties, duties of justice and
duties of benevolence? There seems to be a strong parallel between
the two views. Wherever Thomson sees a virtue in one or another pos-
sible action, Ross sees a prima facie duty, and wherever Ross sees a
prima facie duty, Thomson sees a virtue in one or another possible
action.
Perhaps there is a disagreement about the order of explanation.
Maybe Thomson thinks we have a better grip on what it is for someone
to act unjustly or to be inconsiderate on a particular occasion, and Ross
thinks we have a better grip on what is involved in the prima facie duty
to be honest or benevolent.
One difference is that Ross s duties are prima facie, whereas
Thomson s virtues and vices are all or nothing. In Ross s view there
may be a conflict in prima facie duties. In Thomson s view there cannot
be an analogous conflict. So, for example, Thomson takes it to be impos-
sible to be in a situation in which, if one does A, one will be unjust, and
if one does not do A, one will be cruel.23
There certainly are cases in which there appears to be a conflict
between justice and kindness. A student has written a worthless paper.
If the teacher gives the student the failing grade that the paper
deserves, the student will not graduate, which will be a hardship both
to the student and to the student s family. It would seem not to be fair
to the other students that they are held to a higher standard than this
student. It might seem to be unjust to give the student a passing grade
yet cruel to give the student a failing grade.
How to resolve this apparent conflict? Thomson holds that both these
things cannot be true. It cannot be both unjust to give the student a
passing grade and also cruel not to do so. It cannot be unjust to do
something that it would be cruel not to do and it cannot be cruel to do
something that it would be unjust not to do. So, we have to choose
between these two possibilities. Which is it? Cruel to fail the student
or unjust not to?
Ross would say that we must decide between two prima facie duties,
the duty not to be unfair to the other students and the duty not to harm
the poorer student. If the duty not to be unfair wins out, then we are
not really violating a duty not to harm the student if we fail him. If the
duty not to harm the student takes precedence, then that really is our
Virtue Ethics without Character Traits 125
duty and we do not in this case have a duty of fairness to fail the
student.
For myself, I find it hard to say whether either of these ways of
looking at the issue makes more sense than the other does.
Objectivism
Thomson is an objectivist about the requirements of morality. She says,
a person s having done what morality requires him to do turns on
success rather than on intentions just as, for my own part, I believe
we should accept an objectivist view of the virtue properties (and their
contraries), that is, a view according to which an act s possessing a
virtue property (or its contrary) turns on success rather than on inten-
tions. 24 Does this mean that intentions are irrelevant or just not
enough?
Suppose Joan is morally required to return a book to Max. Uncon-
cerned with this requirement, she leaves the book on a bench in the
park. It happens that Max is the next along. He finds the book and
assumes it has been left there on purpose for him. Has Joan satisfied
the moral requirement to return the book? Has she acted justly? Wasn t
she careless to leave the book on the bench and isn t carelessness a vice?
Perhaps the answer is that carelessness is not a moral vice. Carefulness
is an all-purpose virtue, not a moral virtue. And, perhaps, it was not
unjust of her to leave the book on the bench, given how things worked
out!
But can t someone do the wrong thing through a failure of one of the
all-purpose virtues? Must this always involve a failure in one of the
moral virtues also? To be sure, if Ophelia fails to return the book she
owes to Max through imprudence, maybe then she has acted unjustly
to Max because of her imprudence. But if she wrongly allows Max to
be harmed because of her lack of courage, has she acted unkindly?
Here I am neither sure what the best view is nor sure what
Thomson s view is.
Conclusion
Philosophers attracted to virtue ethics should consider the account of
ethics that Thomson has been developing. Thomson s account focuses
on properties of particular actions and so avoids what seem to be
serious problems with versions of virtue ethics that focus on robust
character traits.25
126 Gilbert Harman
Notes
1. Utilitarianism and the Virtues.
2. The Right and the Good ; Evaluatives and Directives ; and Goodness and
Moral Requirement, from her 1999 Tanner Lectures.
3. Ross and Nisbett, The Person and the Situation; Railton, Made in the Shade: Moral
Compatibilism and the Aims of Moral Theory ; Doris, Persons, Situations, and
Virtue Ethics ; Harman, Moral Philosophy Meets Social Psychology: Virtue Ethics
and the Fundamental Attribution Error.
4. Thomson, The Right and the Good ; Ross, The Right and the Good.
5. Rawls, A Theory of Justice.
6. E.g., Hursthouse, Virtue Theory and Abortion, p. 225. However, Hursthouse imme-
diately goes on to modify her initial account of what someone ought to do.
7. See note 2.
8. For further elaboration see Harman, Human Flourishing, Ethics, and Liberty, pp.
307 322, and references included there.
9. Bennett, The Book of Virtues.
10. Hursthouse, Virtue Theory, p. 227, fn. 2.
11. Harman, Human Flourishing, p. 315. Hursthouse, Virtue Theory, p. 227, notes a
related point: as if the raped fifteen-year-old girl might be supposed to say to herself,
Now would Socrates have an abortion if he were in my circumstances?
12. We might suppose that being a good moral adviser is one of the virtues that an ideally
virtuous person must possess. But then the account would seem to become circular
and trivial. One ought morally to do what one would be advised to do by someone
who advises one to do something if and only if one ought morally to do it.
13. See note 3.
14. Harman, Moral Philosophy Meets Social Psychology.
15. Harman, Moral Philosophy and Linguistics.
16. The Right and the Good, p. 283.
17. Wallace, Virtues and Vices, similarly distinguishes three classes of character traits: (1) [ Pobierz całość w formacie PDF ]